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DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY: IN SEARCH OF 
A STANDARD OF RESPONSmILITY 
MARY J. DAVISt 
INTRODUCTION 
Responsibility! for the consequences of our own actions and 
occasionally for the actions of others seems to have been largely 
forgotten as a foundation for governing conduct. This Article 
advocates re-emphasizing responsibility in one important area, that 
of manufacturer2 liability for product design. To that end, I 
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; 
B.A., 1979, University of Virginia; J.D., 1985, Wake Forest University. This 
Article, in an earlier draft, was the subject of a colloquium presentation by the 
author to the faculty of the University of Kentucky in October 1992 at which 
many valuable suggestions were received. 
1. The term "responsibility" has many different meanings. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines it as "[t]he state of being answerable for an obligation, and 
includes judgment, skill, ability and capacity .... The obligation to answer for an 
act done, and to repair or otherwise make restitution for any injury it may have 
caused." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). It includes the elements 
of reliability and trustworthiness. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTION-
ARY 1005 (1987). Of course, responsibility in a moral or political sense is more 
difficult to derme than the legal sense in which the term is used in this Article. 
For two excellent discussions of the larger role that responsibility should play in 
our tort system, see Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability 
Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 895-908, and 
Timothy T. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: A wareness, Participation, 
and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 470 (1993). 
2. Using the term "manufacturer" implies similarities in all manufacturers 
when their only real similarity is the manufacture and distribution of some product. 
When we hear the word "manufacturer," we think of companies with employment 
rolls in the thousands and very sophisticated design, engineering, manufacturing 
and marketing systems. Not every manufacturer, however, is General Motors 
Corporation. This Article uses the term "manufacturer" to include any entity that 
makes a product for consumption by the public and recognizes that the vast 
majority of product producers are not monolithic entities but are of much more 
moderate character. 
When referring to manufacturers throughout this Article, I use personal 
pronouns, i.e., "he," "she" or "they." Personalizing these companies serves a 
purpose. Identifying a company as a person assigns qualities to it that only thinking, 
feeling humans can have. These qualities include the ability to make value judgments 
with integrity, honesty, morality, and responsibility. To forget that corporations 
1217 
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propose the highest standard of conduct by which to judge product 
manufacturers' design decisions. The standard I propose is higher 
than merely reasonable, prudent conduct and is not the allegedly 
"strict" liability frequently imposed. The standard this Article 
proposes reflects an emphasis on responsible conduct in light of 
the special relationship of trust that exists between manufacturers 
and their customers. 
During the last four decades, courts have made great strides 
in overturning ancient barriers to injured claimants' recovery in 
products liability actions. Courts have accomplished this by shifting 
away from rigid negligence and contract-based liability systems to 
a system of strict tort liability. 3 Critics of the current liability 
system would disagree with the characterization of those changes 
as "strides" because that word implies positive achievements.4 The 
are nothing more than the humans who run them is to ignore that they are capable 
of making all of the conscious choices about how to organize and structure their 
"lives" that each of us does: decisions about the nature of their conduct, the 
quality of their work, how they want to be respected and perceived, and the real 
effect of their decisions on others. 
3. Many scholars have written on the evolution of products liability, its 
history and its purposes. Some of the most renowned examples of this scholarship, 
which were instrumental in forging the changes alluded to and discussed throughout 
this Article are: Francis H. Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other 
Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REv. 343 (1929); Fleming James, Jr., 
Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv. 192 (1955); W. Page Keeton, Products 
Liability-Some Observations about Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329 
(1966); Dix. W. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use 
of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Dix. W. Noel, Mtlnufacturers of Products-
The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957); William L. Prosser, 
The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 
(1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); and Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability: 
The Protection of the Injured Person, 43 CAL. L. REv. 614 (1955). 
For a discussion of the goals strict products liability was intended to achieve, 
see infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the history of 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT § 402A], 
which is the culmination of some of this scholarship and the foundation for modern 
strict products liability, see infra notes 47 to 59 and accompanying text. 
4. Even early on there were many opponents of the movement toward strict 
liability for product-related injures. See, e.g., Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of 
Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 
24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957). 
Most of the criticism has come in the last two decades by those who perceive 
the changes in standards of liability as going too far toward a system of pure 
wealth redistribution that promotes neither safety nor quality in product manufac-
ture and neither economic efficiency nor wealth maximization. See generally WrL-
HeinOnline -- 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1219 1992-1993
1993] DESIGN DEFECTS 1219 
American Law Institute (ALI) recently completed a study on the 
current state of products liability law which thoroughly discussed 
the bases of the insurance crisisS of the 1980s and offered a general 
critique of the products liability system. 6 The ALI Reporters' 
Study, as it is known, met with much criticism.7 However, because 
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory oj Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); 
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
5. The existence of the "insurance crisis" and its causes are the subject of 
some debate. See Scott E. Harrington, Liability Insurance: Volatility in Prices and 
in the Availability oj Coverage, in TORT LAW AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, 47-49 
(peter H. Shuck, ed. 1991). Compare PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988) and George L. Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1566 (1987) with 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Expla-
nation jor Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1991). 
Scholars and other observers of the current products liability system seem to 
agree generally on the need for reform. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1-13 (1991); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Stargazing: The Future oj American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1332 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson and Twerski, Stargazing]; George L. Priest, 
The Invention oj Enterprise Liability: A Critical History oj the Intellectual Foun-
dations oj Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
State legislatures have been instrumental in bringing about certain pro-defen-
dant changes including, for example, statutes of repose, product misuse and 
alteration defenses, and rebuttable presumptions of no defect with proof of 
compliance with governmental regulations or industry practice. See generally Joseph 
Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Ojj to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law 
Rejorm Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207 (1990); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the 
Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Deject Litigation: Ad-
vancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law oj Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521, 
524-25 n.15 (1982) [hereinafter Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground]. 
6. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE REsPONSmILITY FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY, REpORTERS' STUDY, VOLS. I AND II (1991) [hereinafter ALI REPORTERS' 
STUDY]. 
7. This controversial Study was not adopted by the ALI Council, but is 
instead considered a report to the council. See Kenneth Jost, Rarefied Atmosphere 
Masks High Stakes, Deep Passions: ALI turns to Tort Rejorm, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 
27, 1992, at 1. For a critique of the ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, see Stephen D. 
Sugarman, A Restatement oj Torts: American Law Institute Reporters' Study, 
Enterprise Responsibility jor Personal Injury, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1992). 
The Chief Reporter for the ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, Paul C. Weiler, of 
Harvard University Law School, explained the study's conclusion that the insurance 
crisis is "more directly attributable to capital problems on the insurance side of 
the tort regime, not to an explosion of spurious claims," but there was an increase 
in liability imposition on the "wrong defendants" and "inadequate compensation 
for real victims." ALI Tests Waters oj Tort Rejorm, 59 U.S.L.W. 2707 (May 28, 
1991). 
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the ALI is now in the process of preparing a Restatement (Third) 
of Torts which will include a substantial section on products 
liability,8 both critics and advocates of the current system have a 
golden opportunity to press their positions and affect the next 
generation of products liability law.9 To that end, this Article 
argues that the determination of liability for design defects should 
be made in a negligence-based action and should focus on the 
manufacturer's conduct by raising the standard of care to the 
highest level possible. 
The current system of products liability attempts to deal with 
all types of injury-causing product defects lO in the same ways-
using negligence, warranty and strict liability as the three bases of 
establishing liability. Admittedly, strict liability is the prominent 
basis of liability for all types of product defects and is not 
necessarily limited to the simple manufacturing or production flaw 
which prompted the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
8. Product Safety and Liability, 60 U.S.L.W. 2764 (June 9, 1992). 
9. Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski were named 
as co-reporters for the Products Liability section of the planned Restatement (Third). 
One of their key responsibilities will be "to steer a divergent group of scholars 
and practitioners toward completion of the influential study, which is expected to 
take about five years to complete." ld.; see also Already on the Record, LEGAL 
TIMEs, June 8, 1992, at 3 (reporting allegations that Professors Henderson and 
Twerski are pro-business in philosophy and financially backed by business concerns, 
thereby tainting the objectivity of the Restatement (Third». Professors Henderson 
and Twerski have already re-written section 402A in a recent article. James A. 
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992) [hereinafter 
Henderson and Twerski, A Proposed Revision]. 
10. This Article does not address liability for manufacturing flaws, those 
production defects which make the offending product different from the manufac-
turer's specifications. The premise of this Article is, in part, that the history of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and the adoption of strict liability 
that evolved from Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944), both impose liability for manufacturing flaws. 
Design defect litigation did not come to fruition until the 1970s and 1980s and was 
not intended to be enveloped by section 402A, even by its creators. See infra notes 
49-59 and accompanying text. 
Product defects arising from alleged failures-to-warn have occasionally been 
included within the rubric of strict liability, as in comment j to Restatement § 
402A, but are generally considered negligence-based in theory. These claims similarly 
will not be addressed in this Article. For a discussion of failure to warn litigation, 
see James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products 
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990) and 
Aaron D. Twerski, et aI., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-
Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976). 
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section 402A.1l However, when the more complicated litigation 
over allegedly defective generic product designs earnestly began in 
the early 1970s, it became increasingly clear that strict liability 
definitions of "defect" were inadequate to deal with the complex-
ities of manufacturers' conscious design decisions. 12 
In seeking to embrace all product defect claims under the 
scheme of strict liability, courts developed several theories to justify 
strict liability for design flaws. 13 In most instances, courts have 
tried in vain to explain the substantive distinction between negli-
gence and the theory of strict liability used for assessing design 
defects, which supposedly focuses on the condition of the product 
and not the conduct of the manufacturer that created that condi-
tion.14 In their attempts to justify imposing strict liability on what 
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter section 
402A]. For a discussion of the history of the adoption of section 402A, see infra 
notes 47-59 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
13. Strict products liability has been variously defined, but most jurisdictions 
follow a version which closely adheres to the language of section 402A or the 
liability as it has evolved in California through Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) and Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 
1972), which expressly disagreed with the section 402A approach because it "rings 
of negligence." ld. at 1162. See infra notes 60-116 and accompanying text. 
A few isolated jurisdictions impose what may be more properly called absolute 
liability: liability regardless of any evaluation of whether the danger is unreasonable 
or whether the product is defective. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. 
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (imposing absolute liability on asbestos product 
manufacturers for failure to warn by imputing knowledge of all dangers regardless 
of scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 
Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (pa. 1978) (purporting to follow section 402A but 
imposing liability based, in part, on a manufacturer's effective guarantee of his 
products). 
14. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the 
similarity between strict liability for design defects and negligence liability, see 
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 V AND. L. REv. 593 (1980); James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of 
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of 
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLlJM. 
L. REv. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Manufacturers'Design Choices]; James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: 
Toward Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979) 
and James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products 
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1263 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Rejection of Liability Without 
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is essentially a conduct-based evaluation, these courts unfortunately 
ignore the importance of focusing on the manufacturers' respon-
sibility to the consuming public, one of the primary foundations 
of early strict products liability. 
This Article does not advocate a return to evaluating manu-
facturers' conduct by the negligence principles as they existed prior 
to the advent of strict liability, though that is what some advocate.tS 
The standard of care required must be heightened both to reflect 
the advances in consumer protection and product safety brought 
by the struggle of the last decades and, more importantly, to 
comport with the public's demand for manufacturer responsibility. 
Recognizing a heightened standard of care owed by product man-
ufacturers in the design of their products will strike an appropriate 
balance between the conduct society expects and the conduct 
manufacturers can and should provide. 
A heightened level of care which specifically incorporates a 
recognition of responsibility to the consuming public will address, 
in part, the public demand that institutions of power and authority 
acknowledge their responsibility and obligation. 16 Currently, and 
perhaps throughout the reform period, the public conscience seems 
to seek to achieve different goals through the tort liability system 
than those which courts and scholars attribute to the system: 
namely pure compensation, efficiency and risk distribution. 17 The 
Defect]. 
Even the primary author of the risk-utility test for evaluating design defects 
in strict liability, Professor John W. Wade, recognizes that his is basically a 
negligence test. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge 
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U: L. REv. 734, passim (1983) [hereinafter 
Wade, Effect of Knowledge]; John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability 
for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 836-37 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, Strict Tort 
Liability]; John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 
33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 566-569 (1980). 
15. See, e.g., Henderson and Twerski, A Proposed Revision, supra note 9, 
at 1514 (proposing liability for design defects "only if the foreseeable risks of harm 
presented by the product when and as marketed could have been reduced at 
reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a safer design .... "). 
16. See, e.g., Solve Crisis of Confidence, PUBUC RELATIONS JOURNAL 23 
(Jan. 1992) ("People are angry. Credible polls show that the majority of Americans 
no longer trust government or politicians and are increasingly cynical and con-
temptuous toward business. "). 
17. For a discussion of the efficiency goals of tort law, see GUIDO A. 
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 17-21 
(1970); and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-24 (4th ed. 1992). 
But see James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical 
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public seems to instead seek an acknowledgement of the respon-
sibility it is owed by product manufacturers by virtue of the 
relationship of trust and confidence that exists between themselves 
and manufacturers. 
Product manufacturers recognize the public desire for quality 
and safety, as evidenced by advertising campaigns that encourage 
consumers to believe both in them and their products. IS This 
Article proposes a standard which requires compliance with those 
assurances of quality in the design context. It advocates the 
highest standard of care achievable in the product design choices 
made because of the special responsibility owed to consumers. 
Often, the injured claimant primarily seeks an acknowledgement 
by the offending product's manufacturer that he failed in his 
responsibility; a portrayal of some sense of remorse for market-
ing a product which the consumer trusted but which led to 
injury. However, product manufacturers often view injured 
claimants' attempts to obtain redress simply as spurious efforts 
to get money to which the claimants are not entitled. Product 
manufacturers vehemently believe in the excellence of their prod-
ucts and feel wrongly assaulted by attempts to disparage those 
Analysis oj Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1570, 1589-94 
(1991) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Reliance] (of the major types of policy 
rationales identified in product liability decisions, fairness led efficiency in frequency 
in justifying the decisions). For a discussion of the goals and policies behind strict 
products liability, see David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies oj Strict Products 
Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980) [hereinafter Owen, Rethinking the Policies]. 
In addition, Professor Owen has recently attempted to expound on the moral and 
political philosophy that forms the basis of products liability. David G. Owen, The 
Moral Foundations oj Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 427 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations]. Professor Owen 
acknowledges the importance of the special relationship between manufacturer and 
consumer in defining those principles. ld. at 429-30, 436, 473. 
18. For a discussion of this representational basis for product manufacturer 
liability, see Leon Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade 
oj Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1185 (1976); and Marshall S. Shapo, A Represen-
tational Theory oj Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability 
For Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974) [hereinafter Shapo, A 
Representational Theory]. Furthermore, a recent article in the Washington Post 
reported on the new age of commercial altruism as a marketing technique. Don 
Oldenburg, Socially Correct Marketing: Many Firms Are Coming up With <tBig 
Cause" Ads, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at C5. See also Paul J. Schloemer, Let's 
Get America Back to Business, INDUSTRY WEEK, April 6, 1992, at 34 (U.S. 
manufacturers need to make further progress in quality of processes and products 
to meet "the stringent requirements now imposed by virtually all customers, at 
home and abroad."). 
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products. 19 Thus, the participants in the products liability process 
seem to have a fundamental misunderstanding about each other's 
motives; a misunderstanding which ignores the essential nature 
of the other participants' relationship to that process. 
This Article proposes a standard of liability based on the 
high responsibility product manufacturers have to the less in-
formed and necessarily trusting public. Part I supports this 
standard by identifying the general goals of product liability law. 
Part II explores the history of how we came to a strict liability 
system to fulfill those goals. Part III defines the current system 
of imposing liability for product design defects and shows that 
this system is not one of strict liability as was originally intended, 
but is rather one of negligence which focuses on the manufac-
turer's conduct in design decisions. Once it becomes evident that 
design defect liability is properly based on negligence, a reas-
sessment of the standard of conduct to be imposed on product 
manufacturers is in order. 
To establish the proper standard, Part IV elaborates on the 
foundation of product manufacturer responsibility and compares 
the relationship between product manufacturers and their cus-
tomers to that which exists between other categories of respon-
sible actors and their victims where, because of the relationship, 
the responsible actor is held to the highest standard of care possible. 
19. See Milton R. Copulos, An Rx for the Product Liability Epidemic, 
HERITAGE FOUND. REpORTS (May 15, 1985) (reporting manufacturer response at 
onslaught of products claims); see also Product Liability: Executives Say Lawsuits 
Have Forced Firms to Manufacture Safer Products, BNA DAILY REpORT FOR 
EXECUTIVES (Jan. 7, 1988) (many executives believe lawyers and consumer activists 
are responsible for liability crisis and that consumers should assume greater risks). 
Notwithstanding the asbestos products manufacturers' early knowledge of the 
health hazards of asbestos, see Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 
1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), and the knowledge of the 
A.H. Robins Company about the significant hazardous side effects of the use of 
the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device for birth control, see Palmer v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 684 P.2d 187, 196-98 (Colo. 1984), the vast majority of products liability 
cases, particularly design defect cases, involve manufacturers who, generally, are 
interested in the safety of their products. At the risk of being criticized for including 
anecdotal evidence, personal experience in six years of product liability defense 
representation for a variety of manufacturers, large and small, teIls me this is so. 
These manufacturers believe they are acting responsibly when they make the design 
decisions they do. Yet when asked why they did not implement a safety feature, 
they typica1Iy complain about the practical problems and expense, regardless of the 
amount of that expense. 
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Common carriers,2° bailors for hire,21 innkeepers,22 and commer-
cial providers of dangerous services,23 among others,24 are gen-
erally required to exercise the highest degree of care possible in 
their conduct.2s Because of the element of control by one actor 
over the activity, the inherent trust in that control by other 
participants in the activity. the dangerousness of the activity, 
and the high probability of serious harm to unsuspecting persons 
when responsible care is not exercised, this Article analyzes the 
relationships between common carriers and passengers, and be-
tween commercial providers of dangerous services and the public 
in an effort to discover what sets these relationships apart from 
others where conduct is judged simply by the standard of the 
"reasonable and prudent person." 
The primary factor that distinguishes these relationships is 
trust. This trust brings with it a duty to behave not only reasonably 
but responsibly. Responsible conduct reflects an obligation to 
behave in a way that takes into account the interests of a category 
of other participants who are not only less knowledgeable, but 
who are incapable of becoming knowledgeable about the risks 
involved in an activity. The relationships identified above involve 
these participants-the passenger of the carrier and the user of, 
or member of the public affected by, the dangerous commercial 
service. So stands the consumer of a product to the manufacturer 
of that product. A relationship exists which was cultivated by the 
manufacturer, encouraged by necessity, marketing and advertising, 
and culminated in the use by the consumer of the manufacturer's 
product. The above relationships are unique because of the inter-
20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880); see also infra 
notes 126-158 and accompanying text. 
21. See, e.g., Goldman v. Phantom Freight, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1987), leave to appeal denied, 429 Mich. 867 (1987). 
22. See, e.g., Tobin v. Slutsky, 506 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1974); Franklin v. 
Paul DuPuis & Assocs., 543 So.2d 970 (La. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 545 
So.2d 1042 (La. 1989). 
23. See, e.g., Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 642 P.2d 36 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1981), afpd, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984) (supplier of liquified petroleum gas); 
Wooten v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 477 So.2d 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1985) 
(electric utility); see also infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text. 
24. See, e.g., Hanson v. Christensen, 145 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 1966) (public 
swimming resort operator held to high degree of care); Fantini v. Alexander, 410 
A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (karate instructor held to standard of 
care of a professional in the field). 
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, 
§ 34, at 208-209 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]. 
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dependence of the actors-the product manufacturer is dependent 
on the consuming public for its existence and the consumer relies 
on the sophistication of the manufacturer to make its products in 
such a way that they will not be unduly harmful. Because of that 
relationship, the highest standard of care should be required. This 
standard is responsible conduct. Part IV contains an explanation 
of how this high standard of care will apply, suggests a jury 
instruction to implement the standard, and provides examples of 
how the standard will affect a variety of cases. 
1. THE GOALS OF TORT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
Much has been written on what the ultimate goals of a system 
of civil, as opposed to criminal, liability should be.26 There are a 
variety of goals and sub-goals behind tort liability, but there is 
general agreement that two primary categories of goals exist. 27 The 
first is the fairness/rightness category of goals, which reflects the 
belief that tort liability should be considered a means of redressing 
the past wrong inflicted on one by another, regardless of how that 
wrong is ultimately defined.28 The fairness goal recognizes a socie-
26. For a discussion of the distinction between public & private law in the 
torts context, see Leon Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise (PIS. 1 & 2), 38 
TEx. L. REv. 1, 257 (1959-60). A recent symposium on the debate over the 
corrective versus the distributive justice foundations of private and public law, and 
the relationship to tort law in particular, is presented in Symposium: Corrective 
Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbor, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1-
863 (1992). 
27. The ALI Reporters' Study undertakes a full evaluation of the goals of 
tort liability and the different systems available to achieve those goals. ALI 
REpORTERS' STUDY, supra note 6, Vol. 1, at 23-33. For an empirical analysis of 
the policy on which courts rely in making product liability decisions, see Henderson, 
Judicial Reliance, supra note 17. 
28. See OUYER W. HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON LAW 77-80 (Little, Brown & 
Co. ed., 1923) (1881); see also George W. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort 
Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972). This category of goals personifies the values 
of corrective justice. See generally Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations oj 
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective 
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 625 (1992). 
HoImes is the chief advocate of the position that tort liability for personal 
injuries is grounded in fault, which is the failure to exercise that amount of care 
that society requires of us in conducting our activities. See HOLMES, supra at 111; 
see also Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility 
Jor Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1894). Others have criticized 
HoImes' and the nineteenth century theorists' conclusion. Tort liability for personal 
injuries, according to recent revisionists, is non-fault based; i.e., one acts at his 
peril and is liable for injuries directly caused. See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING 
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